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Marco A. Gandásegui (Jr.)*
Global Processes and its Effects
on Latin America
Polycentric vs Perturbed Worlds
The capacity of capitalism to abstractly ‘solve the 
problem of African development’ could be dis-
cussed ad infinitum. Concrete capitalism, such 
as actually exists, that is, globalized, not only has 
failed to ‘solve’ this problem (which it created) 
over the last 150 years (or even over the last 400 
years since the slave trade), but envisages nothing 
for the next 50 years. The challenge will therefore 
only be taken up by the African peoples, the day 
that the necessary popular alliances enable them to 
delink (déconnexion) their development from the 
demands of transnationalization. 
samir Amin (1987)
ThE sPANish-sPEAkiNG WoRLD is celebrating the 400th An-
niversary of Quixote, published in 1605. The book marks Europe’s 
transformation from the old feudal order to a new financially driven 
system of accumulation. Cervantes’ vision of the new times was ex-
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tremely sharp. Let me share with you a dialogue between Don Quix-
ote and sancho his squire.
Fortune is arranging matters for us better than we could have shaped 
our desires ourselves, for look there, friend sancho Panza, where 30 
or more monstrous giants present themselves, all of whom i mean to 
engage in battle and slay, and with whose spoils we shall begin to make 
our fortunes; for this is righteous warfare, and it is God’s good service to 
sweep so evil a breed from the face of the earth.
–What giants? –Panza responds. 
–Those thou seest there –answers his master– with the long arms, and 
some have them nearly two leagues long.
Look, your worship –says Panza– what we see there are not giants but 
windmills, and what seem to be their arms are the sails that turned by 
the wind make the millstone go.
Undeterred, Don Quixote spurs his trusty Rocinante to a shambling 
gallop, only to come to grief as the windmill turns, breaking his spear 
and tossing rider and mount to the ground.
Quixote’s words sound so familiar 400 years later when world leaders 
speak of “righteous wars” and the need to “sweep so evil breed from 
the face of the earth”. (China Daily News, 2005).
so-called globalization is not so new. We can track it down to at 
least since Quixote’s first edition. however, the late 20th Century 
corporate world globalization has spurred a set of new questions. 
According to Wood (2003) the world state system –within which 
globalization keeps growing– is very much a necessity, with its com-
plex institutional apparatuses and its apparent sovereignty. This is 
the context in which “New imperialism” faces all its contradictions 
and defies conflicting interests. on the other hand, for authors like 
hardt and Negri (2001), the Nation-state is obsolete, belonging to 
the past.
At this juncture we will present the ever expanding capitalist 
system and its close ties to the existence of the Nation-state. After 
exploring the notions associated with the Nation-state we will exam-
ine their impact on the XXi Century. We are interested in the pos-
sibilities for autonomous political organizations to flourish among 
peoples of over one half of humanity. What obstacles can be foreseen, 
and what challenges confront the alternatives. Do the alternatives 
push us in the direction of delinking? Does delinking have a special 
relationship with revolution? What are the historical delinking expe-
riences? We will analyze some of the more recent thesis developed in 
the Us to confront these alternatives, specifically to contain future 
delinking processes. We will close with some concluding remarks on 
Latin America.
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The Nation State System
According to Wood, (2000) the capitalist world system in the early XXi 
Century has to confront the growing disparity between the rich and poor 
regions. To conserve the present world order, a result of over 100 years 
of on-going conflicts and struggles, more violence and force will top the 
agenda. Arrighi (2003) believes that we are in a period of transition, a pe-
riod of turbulence1. however, hardt and Negri foresee a new world order 
based on Empire, a state capable of concentrating military and ideologi-
cal (hegemony) power over other lesser states and political entities. 
in the upper-most echelons of Us foreign policy, world order and 
containment has been its priority for decades. however, as we shall 
examine, emphasis and direction change according to new world de-
mands. These challenges to the present world order require solutions. 
For some Us analysts world order has to be “perturbed” on a perma-
nent basis. The proposal entails a hierarchic world with a solid center 
and its periphery. The new world order also must have a “semi-periph-
ery” committed to the global rules.
The proposal underscores the need to “perturb” those countries 
or regions on the periphery that have any delinking tendencies. Quot-
ing Quixote, “this is righteous warfare, and it is God’s good service to 
sweep so evil a breed from the face of the earth”.
how and when will this period of “turbulence” come to an end? 
Will the outcome be a perturbed self-centered Empire ruling over 
many immature Nation-states? or will a “new imperialism” emerge 
with some new and some old “global players” fighting over control 
of the resources within the boundaries of Nation-states? or can a 
polycentric world with multiple regional economic and cultural au-
tonomous expressions at the Nation-state level replace what has been 
centuries of confrontation?
Delinking and Revolution
The appearance of the Nation-state is a product of capitalist 
development. The Capitalist unequal rhythm of expansion create a 
Nation-state system full of contradictions. These conflicts have been 
closely examined on two distinct levels. Firstly, conflicting interests 
between more and less developed countries (that are identified as 
Nation-states). These contradictions lead to the subordination 
of the weaker countries. Wallerstein and Arrighi (1989) set these 
relations in a world system context divided between center and 
periphery.
1 “if the system eventually breaks down, it will be primarily because of the Us re-
sistance to adjustment and accommodation” (Arrighi, 2003). 
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At a second level, conflicts arise among the core states whose 
capitalist expansion tends to clash over control of cheap labor and 
natural resources. Modern capitalist imperialism is a consequence of 
uneven growth and expresses itself through financial competition and 
military confrontation.
Marxists up until early 20th Century saw capitalist relations 
spreading evenly worldwide. however, bolsheviks criticized this view 
saying that imperialism would not allow less developed countries to 
reach full capitalist development. The only alternative open to these 
countries was to delink from capitalist relations and start building 
alternative strategies for development.
The Marxist view of social revolution, a product of internal capi-
talist contradictions, was enriched and, in fact, transformed by what 
was called “Leninism”. Revolution was not only the result of reaching 
a ripe-old capitalist state ready to fall, it could also be understood 
as breaking away from dominant capitalist relations. The delinking 
process was a necessity precisely due to the absence of any feasible 
mature capitalist development.
A long debate ensued within the Marxist ranks pitting the “one coun-
try” thesis against a “world revolution” outlook. The valuable lessons de-
riving from these ideological confrontations can be summarized in a bet-
ter understanding of capitalist underpinnings. Gramsci’s critique of lineal 
development, French structuralism, World systems, and Latin American 
Dependency theory, among others, broke new grounds in this context.
World systems theory centers on these processes that open paths 
for countries to transit from center to periphery, and vice versa. it de-
velops the new notion of semi-periphery to acknowledge the existence 
of an intermediate space. in a way it leans towards criticism of Marx’s 
original views on capitalist development. 
Marx’s theory on a capitalist crisis based on a tendency towards 
falling profit rates, feeding territorial expansion and regional domi-
nation, is overcome through political manipulation and the extrac-
tion of surpluses from non value (productive) sources. These alter-
natives are shrinking in the wake of a diminishing work force and 
the destruction of the environment. Capitalism has shown resilience 
through inclusive political regimes (social democrats and /or Wel-
fare states), as well as exclusive policies both at the Center and the 
Periphery through military takeovers of cheap labor reserves and 
natural resources.
Among the early writings on imperialism –centered on the dan-
gers of war, financial concentration, and its periodization– little atten-
tion was dedicated to the growing polarization of the international 
community. After the 1917 Russian Revolution and the failure of the 
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Western European working class to follow suit, Lenin put forth his 
thesis on building socialism from below. in order to be successful a 
new strategy was necessary: Delinking. only through a state centered 
policy, controlled by a high command, could a relatively backward 
country catch up with the more developed capitalist countries.
The notion startled and confused many of the revolutionaries 
around the world. Lenin’s idea was to build socialism in the middle 
of a capitalist crisis, hoping time would be on the worker’s side. Len-
in’s foresight was amazing taking into account his experience during 
World War i and what was yet to come: The 1929 financial “crash” and 
World War ii. he did not count on capitalisms ability to fight back and 
find new energies where apparently none existed.
The UssR after its foundation in 1923 chose delinking as the best 
option to defend its revolution and to accumulate internally. before 
passing away Lenin stood by the peasant-workers alliance that would 
enable the new state to survive. by the period 1928-1929, however, the 
class alliance was not solving the crucial growth problems faced by 
the UssR. Rapid industrialization could only be achieved by transfer-
ring profits from the rich peasantry to the new economic strategy. The 
economy based on “socialist primitive accumulation” became the new 
battle cry2.
Historical delinking experiences
Russia’s delinking strategy was mainly imposed on her by the central 
powers and ensuing imperialist policies (internal contradictions). 
To survive the blockade and military campaigns, the UssR first 
established an alliance with the small and medium landowners in 
order to create surplus. Later on it subjected the land-workers to 
stringent accumulation policies. Throughout its 70 year history, the 
UssR was forced to compete on uneven grounds with the richer 
capitalist countries. The arms race finally pulled the rug from under 
the soviet regime. The UssR was never able to escape the laws of 
capitalist accumulation.
The autarchic thesis of socialism in one country was trans- 
formed after World War ii into an alternative model of growth for all 
underdeveloped countries. The earlier delinking strategy was aban-
doned and in its place a new socialist world bloc was proposed to 
compete with capitalism.
2 According to bettelheim, Charles (1978) a new economics based on the idea of 
a “socialist primitive accumulation”, put forth by Preobrazhensky, Evgeni (1971) 
would call for “the peasantry (to) pay relatively high prices for industrial products 
and be more or less underpaid for their own produce”.
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The Chinese Revolution right after World War ii seemed to con-
firm the delinking thesis. China’s new leaders rapidly embraced Mos-
cow. however, disputes over peasant worker alliances and agrarian 
surpluses provoked a split by the end of the 50s. in Latin America, the 
Cuban Revolution success reinforced the delinking thesis. in order to 
survive the overwhelming Us offensive the Cuban leadership struck 
an alliance with Moscow. Cuba was able to receive enough petrol and 
cheap food products (for 30 years) to consolidate its new society.
Using the same containment tactics applied to the UssR and 
China, the Us set up an aggressive isolationist policy towards the Car-
ibbean island. The Us developed a dual strategy aimed at destroying 
all national liberation movements as well as to contain all delinking 
processes. Firstly, containment was predicated on an anti-communist 
crusade. secondly, an inclusive policy was hatched based on develop-
ment and economic growth recipes. Today’s classic example is still 
W.W. Rostow’s book on how to confront communism through capital-
ist development (Rostow, 1974).
The Dependency theorists in the 60s put forth an alternative that 
rebukes Rostow’s thesis. its focus centers on capitalist contradictions 
and limitations. Two lines within the Theory of Dependency are rec-
ognized and debated. The first states that countries on the periphery 
will never be successful if the central powers do not make structural 
changes. These changes would clear the way for the less developed 
countries to catch up (Cardoso and Faletto, 1969). 
Prebisch understood the relations as uneasy, begging for more 
autonomy.
by dependence i mean relations between centers and the periphery 
whereby a country is subjected to decisions taken in the centers, not 
only in economic matters, but also in matters of politics and strategy 
for domestic and foreign policies. The consequence is that due to exte-
rior pressure the country cannot decide autonomously what it should 
do or cease doing. The structural changes bring about an awareness 
of this phenomena, and this awareness, this desire for autonomy, is 
one of the integral elements in a critical understanding of the system3 
(Chilcote, 1984).
Chilcote also quotes osvaldo sunkel, a renowned critique of develop-
ment theory, who says that Latin America’s
aim is greater autonomy, in order to achieve development without “de-
pendency” and without marginalization. To achieve this goal, the asym-
3 Chilcote’s quote is from Prebisch, Raul (1980). 
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metrical nature of the present system of international economic rela-
tions must first undergo a thorough reform (sunkel, 1972:517-531).
The second line did not see any possibilities for structural changes 
and proposed a delinking strategy designed to build new alliances and 
create conditions for self-centered surplus accumulation4 (Marini, 
1973; Dos santos, 1977).
We attempt to demonstrate that the dependence of Latin American coun-
tries on other countries cannot be overcome without a qualitative change 
in their internal structures and external relations (Dos santos, 1970).
in a political perspective, Dos santos would add that 
everything now indicates that what can be expected is a long process of 
sharp political and military confrontations and a profound social radi-
calization that will lead these countries to a dilemma: government of 
force, which opens the way to fascism, or popular revolutionary govern-
ments, which open the way to socialism. intermediate solutions have 
proved to be, in such a contradictory reality, empty and utopian (Dos 
santos, 1970).
There is no doubt that the most successful delinking experiment of 
the XXth Century was the creation of the socialist bloc under soviet 
leadership. Although the process was wracked with contradictions, 
Moscow rarely denied entrance to any Nation-state. Another experi-
ence set in motion in a similar direction –with different ideological 
contents and with less success– was the non-aligned movement.
According to samir Amin (2000) these experiments were mainly 
grounded on material objectives, losing perspective of the ideologi-
cal underpinnings. Material aspects were over dimensioned and super 
structural elements were not sufficiently stressed.
The strategic objectives of these revolutions involve a disconnection 
in relation to the logic of the capitalist global expansion. The deploy-
ment of these objectives supposes a power based on a social hegemony 
“national popular” and not a “dictatorship of the proletariat”, as it had 
been conceived in the Marxist tradition, which recognizes the need to 
combine, even conflictively, aspirations of capitalists and other social-
ists character. Progress in achieving these objectives implies, in turn, 
the gradual and steady progress in the democratization of society both 
in the practice of management power and in the economy.
4 For an update on the Dependency debate, osorio, J. (2005).
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An important case that must be studied further is China’s post 1949 
revolutionary experience. Delinking was an immediate response to 
Us military threats. China’s alliance with the UssR enabled Mao 
followers to defend themselves militarily and to reorganize the 
economy. by 1972 China was able to establish new relations with 
the Us and other central powers. by the turn of the XXi Century 
China is considered a rising star capable of becoming the future 
economic world super power on which capital accumulation can 
grow unfettered.
 
China’s re-linking has just begun. With strong similarities to the Us 
experience in early XiX Century or German development in the mid 
19th Century, China seems ready to smash all material and ideologi-
cal obstacles on its way towards becoming a central player in capital-
ist accumulation. China seems to be prepared to take the giant step 
thanks to its work force as well as to its political organization. (Ecolo-
gists have their doubts that the Earth can support a new world player 
–capitalist predator– next to Europe and the Us)5.
The Periphery’s Delinking
Delinking implies a political option taken by a leading social class or 
class alliance to unshackle the economic and ideological bonds im-
posed by the core capitalist powers and to seek new avenues towards 
the creation of self-centered national projects. Are these projects asso-
ciated with any particular economic system or ideological premise? in 
other words, is delinking a step towards joining ranks with capitalism 
or is it supposed to show the road towards socialism?
The present day states successful in their delinking processes are 
at the center of the capitalist accumulation process. Those who failed 
are somewhere between the periphery and the semi-periphery. Where 
will China place itself in the short or medium term? Can Cuba be ana-
lyzed in this context?
Capitalism’s “periphery” is split into two segments. There is the 
proper periphery and there is also a semi-periphery. These are difficult 
categories because they are diffused, expected to describe the move-
ments of Nation-states. The members of the semi-periphery tend to 
move towards the center, with some self-centered accumulation el-
5 others are much more optimist for very different reasons. in a recent newspaper 
article published in beijing an observer had this to say: “Perhaps the strongest reason 
for optimism (over the region) is that it is no longer true that rising powers must inevi-
tably confront existing powers in either an acrimonious rivalry or in overtly belligerent 
competition, said Michael Rich, executive vice-president of Rand Corp, a Us-based 
think tank.”
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ements. The proper periphery has no accumulation properties with 
exporting or enclave economies. 
The Nation-state system offers a stabilizing effect both on politi-
cal relations as well as to the accumulation process. The territorial and 
world market distribution that took place in the XiX Century and the 
containment policies of the XX Century gave capitalism the needed 
stability for accumulation. The European Wars during the XiX Cen-
tury and the XX Century World Wars were necessary in order to make 
the adjustments between old and new power centers.
The XXi Century will face new and more dangerous con-
frontations between incumbent central powers and new candi-
dates. Unlike past centuries, the contenders are not concentrated 
in Europe. Europe along with Russia can become contenders in 
the next battle confronting Us and the Far East (China and Ja-
pan). An armed conflict or an ideological struggle of this kind 
can create conditions for delinking processes at regional levels 
or on a country basis. samir Amin asks himself if delinking is vi-
able or adequate at a regional level. Can delinking be the result of 
one or more leading countries at the periphery? Amin also pro-
poses the possibility of an intermediate road that would lead to 
a new stage of world capitalist expansion based on the accelera- 
ted accumulation of an integrated periphery. (samir Amin, 1997).
Theotonio Dos santos (2005) just recently put brazil’s foreign policy 
in the spot-light presenting the south American country as a new 
“global player”. 
brazil’s new international role implies a world trade strategy with 
new partners. At present brazil has balanced its foreign trade flow 
equally among the Us, Japan and the rest of Latin America. brazil’s 
growing trade with China and Asia, as well as its strategic move to-
wards the Arab countries, and its future association with Russia is 
part of the over-all picture it is sending to the world as a new “Global 
Player”.
Theotonio Dos santos’ approach has very little to do with autarchic 
strategies. in this sense he shares samir Amin’s (2000) view on the 
question that relates to delinking and autarchy. 
We shall not expand here on the theory of delinking but, to avoid 
any misunderstanding, say merely that delinking is not synonymous 
with autarchy but only the subjection of external relations to the 
logic of internal development (whereas adjustment means binding 
internal development to the possibilities afforded by the world sys-
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tem). in more precise terms, delinking is the refusal to submit to the 
demands of the worldwide law of value, or the supposed ‘rationality’ 
of the system of world prices that embody the demands of reproduc-
tion of worldwide capital. it, therefore, presupposes society’s capac-
ity to define for itself an alternative range of criteria of rationality 
of internal economic options, in short a “law of value of national 
application”.
The US and Delinking
in recent years new world-views have made their way to the top of 
the best seller lists in the Us. Although not truly original, what makes 
them special is their focus on the future of capitalism, uneven devel-
opment, and delinking processes. Author samuel huntington discov-
ers Gramsci´s notion of hegemony to base his theories on the inevita-
ble clash of civilizations and the survival of capitalism. More recently, 
Thomas barnett (2004) Professor at the Naval War College (Rhode 
island), has sparked controversy by stressing the need to introduce 
discipline on a world scale in order to subdue conflicts in an expand-
ing capitalist system6.
The nature of the system’s contradiction require correctives that 
can deal with threats of dismemberments, to avoid disconnections be-
tween its parts that can put the whole in danger. According to barnett, 
globalization is not a lineal process and much less an opportunity for 
less developed countries to catch-up with the richer nations7. barnett 
agrees with other authors reviewed here that the capitalist system has 
a center and a periphery8. in his particular view, the Us stands alone 
as the center´s nucleus. The rest of the developed world is grouped 
together in a “semi-periphery” status. The periphery is made up of all 
other Nation-states characterized by their instability, ruled by politi-
cal dictators and often with enormous natural resources. Under nor-
mal conditions, the system has no major problems it cannot solve. 
however, the center-periphery relationship generates what barnett 
calls “collateral damages”. These are mainly maverick Nation-states 
that delink from the capitalist system.
6 For a further analysis of barnett’s proposals see Ana Esther Ceceña, (2004).
7 see Garcia Arias, (2004) an analyst at ECLA, for a deeper analysis of neo-liberal 
policies.
8 barnett rejects Wallerstein’s formulation of the concept. in an interview with 
Martinovich (2004) the political scientist says “As for Wallerstein’s brand of watered-
down Marxism, let’s remember that he posited that the Core needed to keep the Pe-
riphery down in order to stay rich. i’m making exactly the opposite argument. if 
anyone wants to link me to Wallerstein, they better note i turn that now outdated (it 
worked for a while in the 1970s) argument on its head.”
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According to Peet (2005)
barnett describes a binary opposition: on one side there is a function-
ing core, a wonderful world, where the good stuff is found and the good 
life lived, with sacred America acting as the beacon of liberty; while on 
the other side there is the “disconnected gap”, where the bad stuff usu-
ally happens, off-grid locations where security problems and instability 
congregate, dangerous places that constitute a demand pattern for U.s. 
security exports. This cartography of American enlightenment guides a 
new attitude toward the world, intensifying the existing sense of global 
supremacy by expressing it always in optimistic terms, in contrast to 
terms of eternal lack in the places waiting for freedom to be imposed.
With the collapse of the socialist bloc and with China’s relinking, the 
Us has identified a new enemy for the XXi Century. barnett discards 
the cultural threats to world order (religions, islam, and others) and 
identifies as dangerous all those countries that have delinked as well 
as those with possibilities of doing so. Peet singles out another glimpse 
of barnett´s theory: 
The enemy is neither religion (islam), nor place, but the condition of 
disconnectedness. To be disconnected in this world is to be isolated, 
deprived, repressed, and uneducated. For barnett, these symptoms of 
disconnectedness define danger. simply put, if a country was losing 
out to globalization, or rejecting much of its cultural content flows, 
chances are that the United states would end up sending troops there. 
so barnett thinks that the 1990s revealed neither chaos nor uncer-
tainty, but the defining conflict of our age, a historical struggle that 
screams out for a new U.s. vision of a future world worth creating. 
strategic vision in the United states needs to focus on “growing the 
number of states that recognize a stable set of rules regarding war and 
peace” –that is, the conditions under which it is reasonable to wage 
war against identifiable enemies of “our collective order”.
barnett divides the system’s center into two parts. Firstly, a country or a 
region is functional to capitalism if it can manage the flows that integrate 
national and world economies (ideas, services, money, and media). At 
a second level, the system is made up of a group of countries or regions 
that do their best to harmonize their internal laws with dominant global 
rules of democracy, rule of law and the free market. Countries that are 
well behaved are those whose requests to join the WTo are accepted.
Peet comes to the conclusion that according to barnett “a country is 
‘disconnected’ (delinked) when it fails to gain the confidence of multi-
national corporations, which limits foreign investment”. barnett adds 
that this may be the case,
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because the country is a theocracy, is spatially isolated, connected to 
the world via corrupt state-run telecommunications media, pursues 
illicit gain, treats its women as birth machines and therefore limits 
its labor force and export potential, or because it is “blessed” with too 
many raw materials that constitute its main exports.
barnett also says “connectedness is kept from appearing in the ‘gap’ 
(peripheral countries) by wars, leaders who stay too long, and so on”.
barnett’s book puts forth two interesting proposals to maintain an 
Pax Americana in the XXi Century and neutralize contending alterna-
tives (delinking). To start off with, barnett suggests that the Us should 
create a systems Administration Force. This would entail dividing 
the Pentagon (Defense Department) into two divisions. one division 
would take care of traditional armed forces and their deployment on a 
world scale. The other division would take charge of the new systems 
Administrative Force with the task of reshaping and guiding all de-
linked countries9. Chet Richards (2005) comments that barnett’s goal 
to “perturb” countries that are delinked would be impossible if such a 
scheme were not in place. 
Without such a force, we might –through massive military effort– per-
turb a Gap country’s system, but we will have no mechanism to steer it 
into the Core. We are seeing this in iraq today where the initial surgery 
on the country was successful, but both the patient and the surgeon 
may succumb to the post-operative infection.
barnett’s idea of “perturbing” countries that are delinked (or in the 
“gap”) is not quite the same as destroying nations or peoples. it is 
more a question of creating instability and redefining the existing 
set of rules between Nation-states. barnett believes that in order to 
reach full-fledged globalization a third of today’s world population 
(2 billion persons) would have to perturbed. in order to reach such 
a goal the proposed systems Administrative Force would have to 
recruit some 20 million persons to work on a global scale on an in-
definite basis.
it is worthwhile noting that barnett predicts the political annexa-
tion of the whole Caribbean basin to the Us in the next 50 years. This 
9 The Us created an office of Reconstruction and stabilization at the state 
Department, with many of barnett’s proposals, in August 2004. President George 
bush gave a major speech explaining the office’s mission last May. see George 
W. bush, 2005, supporting Emerging Democracies, Remarks at the international 
Republican institute Dinner, Renaissance hotel, Washington, DC, 17 May, Us state 
Department Web Page.
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includes Mexico, Central America, and the northern portion of south 
America (a population close to 225 million inhabitants). he also fore-
sees a Mexican-born President at the White house by the middle of 
the XXi Century.
A Polycentric World vs a Perturbed World
barnett’s world-view does not deviate much from past capitalist ex-
periences. According to the Professor at the Us Naval War College, in 
order to avoid delinking from the system on behalf of Nation-states 
or whole regions, a strategy must be set up to defeat any new alter-
natives. barnett is very explicit in detailing the consequences these 
movements could have for the present world order.
samir Amin’s theoretical proposals are precisely what worry Us 
strategists the most. According to Amin, the only alternative open to 
countries at the periphery is to delink from a system that presents no fu-
ture to them. if new alternatives appear on the horizon several centers 
could compete with their own dynamic, creating a polycentric world.
barnett’s proposal contemplates precisely such a scenario. A 
polycentric world, apparently, would not be tolerated in barnett’s 
scheme. in order to dampen delinking tendencies, barnett foresees 
two forms of perturbations. Those created by central forces in order 
to destabilize delinked Nation-states or countries that have plans to 
disconnect from the system. barnett also mentions the possibility 
that the center itself can be perturbed by events such as the New 
York City Twin Towers attacks (Arrighi, 2005)10. 
A weakness in barnett’s proposal lies in his center-periphery no-
tion placing the former and the semi-periphery in an ironclad alliance. 
in other words, the center’s nucleus and the semi-periphery would 
be capable of absorbing any autonomous challenge coming from al-
ternative projects. barnett shares hardt and Negri’s view of a future 
dominated by a central state capable of maintaining the rule of law 
on a global scale.
Wood however does not agree with this view of Empire. she con-
siders the arrangements evolving around the “New imperialism”, as a 
system of Nation-states linked by a global economy but managed by 
local states, vulnerable to popular and democratic struggles. in a situ-
ation of this kind, there is more and more room for opposition move-
ments to expand and exploit the contradictions created by the core’s 
growing demands and its local political allies.
10 Arrighi in his article remarks that “scaring hell out of the American people’ was 
highly successful in helping establish Us hegemony in the wake of the second World 
War, but is now, in all likelihood, helping to bring that hegemony to an end.” 
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Jameson (2000) asks if whole regions or continents can delink 
from the logic of capitalist accumulation. Apparently, Jameson says, 
globalization seems irreversible albeit the fact that only a few decades 
ago a large segment of the world’s population belonging to the social-
ist bloc was delinked. Jameson believes that the collapse of the UssR 
was not due to the failure of socialism but to the fact that the socialist 
bloc abandoned its project of disconnection11. 
samir Amin’s polycentric world with its multicultural shapes and 
forms (¨national popular social hegemony¨) can emerge from capital-
ism’s contradictions and face-off with barnett’s permanent perturbed 
world foreseen by those defenders of a renewed Empire, based on 
a free market rational. The contradictions that characterize the ap-
pearance of new economic and cultural powers, with world hegem-
onic ideas (imperialism), will also provoke new grass-root movements 
as well as Nation-state delinking processes. These movements will 
search for original channels of cooperation capable of setting up new 
grounds for the building of viable alternatives. 
Latin America
For 200 years Latin America has been formulating projects that have 
universal underpinnings. The revolutionary wars fought for independ-
ence between 1808 and 1824 put forth a new Nation-state ideology 
expressed in the writings of bolivar and others. At the end of that cen-
tury, Jose Marti put forth a new set of ideas addressing social issues. 
in the mid XX Century the “Latino-americanists” strived with no avail 
towards industrial development trying to gear the continent’s future 
towards economic growth through import-substitution polices.
The new national markets created by industrialization gave rise, 
however, to a belligerent working class as well as to new aspirations 
on behalf of a local class of entrepreneurs. This “populist” alliance 
gave hope to a national project based on productivity and equality.
Cuba’s 1959 populist revolution was forced by a failed Us-led mil-
itary invasion and a blockade (now in its 44th year) to jump over this 
11 Jameson’s quote is the following: “Might regions, even whole continents, 
exclude the forces of globalization, secede, or ‘delink’ from it?… The aura of doom 
that seems to hang over globalization’s putative irreversibility confronts us with 
our own inability to imagine any alter-native, or to conceive how ‘delinking’ from 
the world economy could possibly be a feasible political and economic project in 
the first place –and this despite the fact that quite seriously ‘delinked’ forms of 
national existence flourished only a few decades ago, most notably in the form 
of the socialist bloc. i have taken the unpopular position that the ‘collapse’ of the 
soviet Union was due, not to the failure of socialism, but to the abandonment of 
delinking by the socialist bloc.”
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“phase” of creating the “national market” going straight to a radical-
ized political process. in the southern Cone countries of Latin Ameri-
ca, populism also led to an inevitable show-down with the Us. on the 
one hand, with regard to Cuba a weaker middle-class existed and, on 
the other, a very powerful military was organized under Us guidance 
to contain changes and unleash one of the bloodiest political reactions 
in history. The 1964-1989 military dictatorship’s era first objective was 
to smash the “populist” alliance and follow up with the destruction of 
the working class.
The first objective was swiftly accomplished due mainly to the lack of 
a political commitment on behalf of the middle classes that were not 
able to coalesce behind the “national project”. The second goal was 
more difficult due to the essence of capitalist development based on 
the accumulation of surplus labor. A new strategy was needed to con-
trol the worker’s protests and especially their class organizations. 
Neo-liberalism was unfolded to enhance capitalist accumula-
tion but more specifically to control workers and their organizations. 
Deregulation, flexibilization and privatization were the three mira-
cle words in the neo-liberal vocabulary. Globalization entailed a new 
ideological strategy to weaken the workers and block any class alli-
ances. After the neo-fascist onslaught came to an end, the neo-liberal 
objective was altered in the 80s: The goal was no longer to submit 
the working class and destroy its organizations. The new tactic was 
even more radical: wipe the working class out and make it disappear 
through globalization. shrink it in size and make it competitive as 
well. Presidents like Collor (brazil), Menem (Argentina), and dictator 
Pinochet (Chile) were given the task. All three failed miserably and left 
their countries in shambles. 
since the 90’s a new tactic has been developed. Globalization still 
means shrinking the size of the working class and making it competi-
tive (squeezing any class solidarity out of it) but a new very important 
component has been added: bring the working class into the politi-
cal equation inviting its political parties to lead the way into globali-
zation. These are apparently the new roles of former working class 
revolutionary parties such as brazil’s PT, Chile’s PS, Argentina’s Justi-
cialistas, Uruguay’s Frente Amplio. Mexico will probably follow shortly 
(2006) with PRD. Where there are no alternative working class po-
litical parties available, a Chavez (Venezuela) will appear and an Evo 
Morales (bolivia) will surely be present.
There is an optimistic reading of current events in Latin America. 
What seems to be a triumph of globalization over local or regional alter-
natives can give shape, paradoxically, to a new –polycentric– scenario in 
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the near future. As seen before, brazil has its own strategy and has been 
able to block Us plans to “perturb” its political ambitions. Argentina 
has all the promise (a “first world” country in the late 19th Century) and 
will probably have to back brazil as the “world player” in the region.
Mexico will probably support with enthusiasm the new regional 
project once the PRD government takes over in 2006. Chile has always 
been a wild card but will probably follow brazil’s leadership in the 
short run12. 
Can the Us continue controlling events in Latin America as it 
has done since annexing half of Mexico in 1846? The pessimistic 
scenario is put forth by Us Naval War College Professor Thomas 
barnett. (2003) The Us is planning on setting new political bounda-
ries with its southern neighbors. The new boundary set by barnett’s 
perturbed world by 2050 would be the great Amazon basin in the 
heart of south America. 
No more speculations. Latin America is on the road to new un-
foreseeable political and social arrangements in the near future. At 
present they cannot be predicted. however, the world system’s center 
and/or imperialism’s conflicting interests still foresee a subjugated 
Latin America. it is up to the Latin Americans to build their own alter-
natives. To paraphrase samir Amin (1987): 
The challenge will therefore only be taken up by the Latin American 
peoples, the day that the necessary popular alliances enable them to 
delink their development from the demands of transnationalization.
Can we conclude asking ourselves, along with all human-kind with 
whom we share this planet, who are –today– those monsters the Quix-
ote identified 400 years ago as his enemies that must be wiped from 
the face of the earth? 
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